Hydrogen Buses Keep Failing – De Lijn Is Just The Latest To Cut Losses – CleanTechnica

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Founded in 1947 in Belgium, Van Hool was a storied name in bus and coach manufacturing, known for producing a range of vehicles spanning diesel, hybrid, battery-electric, and hydrogen fuel-cell models. For decades, it supplied public and private transport fleets across Europe and beyond, cementing its reputation as an innovative leader in mobility.

By the early 2000s, as alternative powertrains gained traction, Van Hool became one of the first European manufacturers to seriously explore hydrogen fuel-cell buses. The vision was compelling: zero-emission public transport with fast refueling and long range, making hydrogen a viable alternative to diesel and an apparent complement to battery-electric solutions. The company secured orders for hydrogen buses in multiple markets, including Belgium and the United States, touting them as the future of clean transit.

Yet, the economics of hydrogen-powered buses were always precarious. Unlike battery-electric counterparts, which benefited from rapid improvements in energy density, cost reductions, and expanding charging infrastructure, hydrogen vehicles remained expensive to purchase and operate. The refueling infrastructure was sparse, plagued by supply-chain bottlenecks, and burdened with high maintenance costs.

Compounding these challenges, Van Hool found itself struggling financially. By the time it was declared bankrupt by a Belgian commercial court in June 2023, the company had reportedly amassed nearly €400 million in debt. Years of slow adaptation to the shifting landscape of bus manufacturing — where battery-electric technology was increasingly dominant — left it vulnerable. While its hydrogen venture had seemed forward-thinking, it ultimately proved to be a costly miscalculation.

Van Hool did sell battery-electric buses, but it was relatively slow in fully embracing the shift to electrification. The company offered battery-electric models, including the A12 and CX45E, targeting urban transit and intercity markets. However, its focus remained divided across multiple powertrain technologies, including diesel, hybrid, and hydrogen fuel-cell buses.

Unlike competitors that aggressively transitioned to battery-electric technology — such as BYD, Solaris, and Daimler Buses — Van Hool maintained a mixed strategy. Solaris has maintained a diverse powertrain strategy, offering both battery-electric and hydrogen fuel-cell buses, but what sets it apart from Van Hool is its clear prioritization of battery-electric technology while treating hydrogen as a niche option rather than a core focus. Van Hool’s hesitancy contributed to its financial struggles, as the market increasingly favored battery-electric buses due to their lower operational costs, more developed infrastructure, and growing government incentives.

Van Hool’s financial troubles were exacerbated by its reluctance to shift manufacturing to lower-cost regions, a move that many competitors embraced to remain competitive. While European bus manufacturers like Solaris and Mercedes-Benz increasingly relied on production facilities in lower-wage countries to reduce costs, Van Hool kept the bulk of its manufacturing in Belgium, where high labor expenses added to its financial strain. Although it eventually opened a plant in North Macedonia in 2013, this expansion was slow and insufficient to offset rising costs.

For context, Belgium is divided into three major regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region, each with its own official language and government structure. Flanders, in the north, is Dutch-speaking, and its residents are known as Flemish. Wallonia, in the south, is primarily French-speaking, with a small German-speaking community in the east. The Brussels-Capital Region is officially bilingual (French and Dutch) but predominantly uses French.

Public transit is also split along these regional lines: De Lijn operates in Flanders, TEC (Transport En Commun) runs services in Wallonia, and STIB/MIVB (Société des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles/Brusselse Vervoersmaatschappij) serves Brussels. All three transit operators are state-owned, with De Lijn managed by the Flemish government, TEC by the Walloon government, and STIB/MIVB by the Brussels-Capital Region government.

De Lijn in Flanders introduced five hydrogen buses in Antwerp in 2014, supported by an on-site hydrogen filling station. However, issues with servicing and operational costs quickly became apparent. By 2018, the Flemish government had ruled out further purchases of hydrogen buses, citing their high costs, maintenance difficulties, and an uncertain hydrogen supply chain.

When Van Hool finally collapsed in 2023, it left De Lijn and other customers without support for their hydrogen fleets. With no maintenance options and rising operational costs, De Lijn recently dismantled its hydrogen filling station and retired the remaining hydrogen buses. Annick De Ridder, the Flemish minister for mobility, made the decision clear: “The focus of De Lijn is on battery vehicles. There are no plans to use hydrogen buses. From an operational and financial point of view, hydrogen is currently not interesting for public transport in Belgium.”

Quantron in Germany made a similar bad bet to Van Hool, supporting both battery-electric and hydrogen drivetrains. It left IKEA Austria with a fleet of useless vehicles, unsupported and inoperable after Quantron went under. The pattern is clear: not focusing solely on battery-electric drivetrains is fiscally ruinous. When manufacturers fold, customers are left with expensive paperweights.

As I wrote in October of 2024, New Flyer in North America is making the same strategic blunder as Quantron and Van Hool, not committing to battery-electric and wasting money on hydrogen, and North America’s transit agencies are at risk as a result. New Flyer’s battery-electric buses are more expensive than competitors and less capable due to their lack of focus on the high costs of building hydrogen buses as well. Combined with the well-documented problems with hydrogen buses including low reliability, expensive maintenance and expensive fuel, my assertion is that that every hydrogen bus New Flyer manages to sell loses it the sale of three battery-electric buses.

For over two decades, hydrogen bus trials around the world have followed the same predictable arc: big promises, high costs, operational headaches, and inevitable abandonment. From Vancouver and Chicago in the early 2000s to Vienna, Mallorca, and Wiesbaden just last year, transit agencies have repeatedly launched pilot programs only to watch them collapse under the weight of economic reality. Maintenance costs soar, refueling stations break down, and the hydrogen supply chain remains an expensive mess. Time and again, agencies have either quietly retired their hydrogen fleets or outright canceled planned procurements, yet some still fail to absorb the obvious lesson—hydrogen for public transit is an overhyped dead end.

The sheer scale of failures should be enough to deter any rational transit planner. Iceland mothballed its fleet when EU funding dried up. Perth abandoned its trial. Whistler’s fleet froze in the cold and cost taxpayers a fortune. São Paulo, Oslo, San Remo, Hamburg, Pau, Montpellier, and Tarragona all tried and rejected hydrogen for the same reasons. Even Liverpool, unable to secure a viable hydrogen supply, saw its brand-new fleet sit idle. Meanwhile, California keeps propping up hydrogen transit with billions in subsidies, driven more by lobbying than logic. The bottom line is clear: where hydrogen trials have been objectively assessed, agencies overwhelmingly shift to battery-electric buses — cheaper, simpler, and already dominating the market. If history is any guide, today’s hydrogen transit enthusiasts will be tomorrow’s cautionary tales.

De Lijn’s decision to scrap its hydrogen buses and dismantle its refueling infrastructure is just the latest in a long line of transit agencies abandoning hydrogen in favor of battery-electric buses. De Lijn’s move comes as no surprise — Van Hool’s bankruptcy left its hydrogen fleet without support, refueling was costly, and maintenance became impossible. The Flemish government’s blunt assessment — that hydrogen is not viable for public transit — echoes the conclusions reached by agencies worldwide. Hydrogen’s champions keep promising that economies of scale will fix its glaring flaws, but history keeps proving them wrong. De Lijn is just the latest to cut its losses, and it won’t be the last.